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The Political Economy of 
Late-Night Comedy 
Don Waisanen 
This chapter explores the degree to which comedy can speak truth to power, 
especially in a time when those in power use comedy to serve their own truths. 
From a systemic and institutional perspective, I position late-night comedy 
television shows in the overall political economy of media. Three insights are 
generated about the challenges that comedians face at a neoliberal, structural 
Jevel: the expectation for institutional returns, the containment of comedy 
as small revolutions , and the advance of a cynical labor that precedes and 
informs modern comedy production. I conclude with some thoughts on what 
]ate-night shows and their audiences might do to better serve the public inter-
est and counter co-optations by powerful figures and institutions. 
Nearly two decades ago on NBC's Saturday Night Live, a sketch called 
''Conspiracy Theory Rock'' delivered a blistering critique of NBC, its par-
ent company General Electric, media executives, and the overall concentra-
tions of ·'media-opoly" power in mainstream networks (Conspiracy 2011 ). 
Although it wasn't subtle about its targets, the show's producers and other 
vetters decided that the sketch ' s comedic stylings were enough to land it a 
prime time spot on national television. With a dose of institutional self-dep-
recation and a sense that the consequences would be as fleeting as the laughs. 
the sketch aired. the show went on, and business continued-no harm done. 
As this example points out, speaking truth to power is a tricky endeavor. 
Speaking truth to power through comedy is even trickier. After the Brexit 
vote and the election of Donald Trump to the highest office in the United 
States (a result arguably attained through some comedic prowess [Bershid-
sky 2016]), media pundits asked a reasonable question: "Is late-night politi-
cal comedy useless? " (Crouch 2016). Night after night, joke after joke, our 
political comedians take to the airwaves to deliver smart and hilarious barbs 
at the forces that continue to devastate our environment, promote social 
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inequalities, and slash public services, among other issues. Given the ways 
that politics and business as usual continue unperturbed, however, comedy 
with the best intentions of social change can often seem like a molehill look-
ing up at a mountain. 
In a trend that shows few signs of waning. we also increasingly see those 
in power using comedy to serve their own political ends. Consider how can-
didates such as Sarah Palin, Barack Obama, and Donald Trump have been 
both made fun of and performed on shows like Saturday Night Live. Comedy 
by the powerful has shifted from an informal tool to a formal expectation. 
Even the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency now engages in satirical tweets 
(Schwartz 2015; for some historical background, see also Waisanen 2015). 
Emily Nussbaum (2017) notes how 
by 2016 the wheel had spun hard the other way: now it was the neo-fascist 
strongman who held the microphone and an army of anonymous dirty-joke dis-
pensers who helped put him in office. Online, jokes were powerful accelerants 
for lies-a tweet was the size of a one-liner, a "dank meme·· carried farther than 
any op-ed .... Ads looked like news and so did propaganda and so did actual 
comedy. on both the right and the left-and every combination of the four was 
labelled "satire." In a perverse twist, Trump may even have nm for President as 
payback for a comedy routine: Obama's lacerating takedown of him at the 201 l 
White House Correspondents' Dinner. (pars 1-2) 
Comedy has always been porous in both form and content, but there are 
now larger developments at hand. Nussbaum's comment indicates that com-
edy's boundaries have been collapsed in a swirl of players, platforms, and 
policies. If anything, this suggests that scholars should be thinking more 
about the higher, structural levels of influence in which political comedy 
plays out. 
Examining comedy in neoliberalism's context is hence a timely endeavor. 
Neoliberalism has been defined as ·'the defining political economic paradigm 
of our time-it refers to the policies and processes whereby a relative handful 
of private interests are permitted to control as much as possible of social life 
in order to maximize their personal profit" (McChesney 2008, 283-284). It 
is "a philosophy viewing market exchange as a guide for all human action" 
(Dean 2009, 51). Neoliberalism has invaded just about every sphere of mod-
em life, from politics to religion to academia, circumscribing substance and 
style to the range of what is profitable (McChesney 2008, 42 l). So it should 
come as little surprise that comedy itself might be affected by the opaque 
pressures of neoliberal structures. 
While I'm generally supportive of political comedy, my previous work 




































The Political Economy of Late-Night Comedy 161 
perspective, recognizing that all types of communication have limitations 
and tradeoffs (e.g., comedy's fixation with distortion and difficulties in 
dealing with complexity) (see Waisanen 2013a). In this chapter, I use the 
"political economy of media" as a perspective for thinking about how 
comedy's potential for social change can be thought about from a higher, 
structural viewpoint, especially when positioned within neoliberalism' s 
architectures and offshoots. Scholarly work on comedy more often than not 
looks to single texts or audience reception to address how comedy works 
and what it does (Becker and Waisanen 2013). A next step is to focus on 
how neoliberalism affects political comedy, especially in late-night shows 
that act as one of the main platforms for developing and repeating certain 
systemic commitments. 
Political economists of media tend to think about the role that systems 
and institutions play in media and depoliticization (McChesney 2008, 12). 
My goal here is less to examine the specifics of policies than to think more 
structurally about political comedy as a heuristic lens for examining late-
night comedy shows. Ultimately, "The central question for media political 
economists is whether, on balance, the media system serves to promote or 
undermine democratic institutions and practices .... And equipped with 
that knowledge, what are the options for citizens to address the situation" 
(McChesney 2008, 12). With these questions in mind, I point toward "the 
discourses of the social structure which clearly have an existence which is 
in some measure at ]east independent of comic texts" (Palmer 1987, 59-60). 
I only bring up examples from shows, particular jokes or bits, or other fea-
tures as illustrative of more general problems in comedy's wranglings with 
neolibera]ism writ large. Part analysis , pa11 thought experiment, I offer three 
interlocking themes about late-night shows in the political economy of media 
that would largely remain hidden without a structural criticism. I conclude with 
thoughts on what comedy producers and audiences might do to better serve the 
public interest and counter co-optations by powerful figures and institutions. 
INSTITUTIONAL RETURN 
Late-night shows answer to institutional profits. Amidst· all the comedy writ-
ing and performance that carries through our airwaves, profit-making still 
remains the core concern around which most work transpires . Although this 
fact is seldom acknowledged, late-night shows drive profit for their respective 
overlords, so much that any show that works against that mission will quickly 
be cut. Just ask Larry Wilmore, whose short-lived show on Comedy Central 
experimented with pointed debates and continually focused on U.S. race 
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relations, leading to low viewerships and an eventual cancellation (Littleton 
2016). 
This isn't to judge the quality of late-night shows and their writing and 
performance skills, but rather to highlight how the institutional constraint of 
profit-making limits the types of comedy we're even able to see. Scholars 
now underscore how "strong hegemonic elements" can exist within programs 
like The Daily Show, creating a ··paradox of sociopolitical comedy" (Ander-
son and Kincaid 2013, 1 ). As much as late-night television shows lambaste 
public foolishness at every level, they are still part of many of the same insti-
tutional structures they critique. 
If there's any fault in modem comedy studies, it may be that we·ve been 
too forgiving of how, for example, Stephen Colbert relies on advertising dol-
lars to keep his show going. Our political comedians generally do a masterful 
job of working within those structures and pushing the boundaries of what 
can be thought and said. To Colbert's credit, he has gone from late-night 
cable to a mainstream channel and increasingly amped up his political cri-
tiques, especially of the Trump administration (Reilly 2017). 
Yet the elephant in the room still remains corporate advertising as a neces-
sary condition to continued success. Ultimately, many corporate sponsors are 
happy for the jokes, sketches, and other comedic elements to fly thick about 
political figures each evening. They know that at the end of the day adver-
tisers will still pay up, pockets will be filled, and portions of these monies 
wilLstill flow from their media organizations to those same representatives, 
who won "t get in their way when it comes to creating media policies and 
regulations. 
An objection could be made that these steps are too removed from the 
day-to-day operations of late-night shows. But this is precisely where think-
ing about political comedy from a higher, neoliberal, and structural level 
becomes useful. We can certainly look to the compelling comic strategies and 
effects that these shows manifest with viewing audiences (Becker, Xenos, 
and Waisanen 2010), and how they promote divergent thought in an environ-
ment where our corporate and governmental leaders would rather citizens 
focus on short-sighted or error-filled narratives (Waisanen 2011). If it's the 
case that the funding that keeps shows like Colbert's or even Samantha Bee's 
Full Frontal in place trickles up to decision-makers who have no interest in 
the social and political changes these shows implicitly and explicitly assert, 
however, it's more than a thought experiment to argue that the sum of these 
efforts may be as much about neoliberal perpetuation as radical insight. 
Although it may seem like a glum prognosis, to get accurate about 
the comedy's conditions of possibility, it's worth targeting how comedy 
speaking truth to power is dwarfed by the larger neoliberal players and struc-







































The Political Economy of Late-Night Comedy 163 
of the public arena (Szakolczai 2012, 4), armies of writers and performers 
produce cutting-edge, hilarious material that makes important contributions 
to the public discourse at the cost of sustaining powerful actors whose jobs 
are defined by profit and loss statements. There· s a common saying in com-
edy that "you're only as good as your last joke" (Carr and Greeves 2006, 
n.p.). With neoliberalism in mind, perhaps a clarification is order-"you 're 
only as good as your last joke's ability to fund this institution and its network 
of influence." 
SMALL REVOLUTIONS 
George Orwell once said that jokes are "tiny revolution[s]" (Orwell 1968. 
284 ). Looked at from a purely textual viewpoint, this comment suggests that 
Trevor Noah's or Jimmy Fallon's nightly prods at politicians play a small but 
significant part in fomenting incremental rebellions. Yet, when thought about 
less as a matter of formal properties and more in terms of comedy's structural 
milieu. the phrase unlocks another idea: that jokes are tiny contributions to 
subversity. What's worse, using another meaning of ·'revolution" (Waisanen 
2013b ), they may only bring all of us full circle. revolving to the same condi-
tions we started with. 
This idea is worth taking seriously. Among the national and global flows 
of finance, the widening gaps between rich and poor, and corporations' 
influence on governments (some find the whole point of neoliberalism is not 
just corporate influence but to eliminate politics altogether [Brown 2015]). 
nightly monologues by Seth Meyers look very small indeed. That the jokes, 
sketches, parodies. and more may only bring us all back to exactly where we 
began-comedy as a peripheral revolution around a neoliberal axis-lessens 
the stakes for late-night shows in the political economy of media further. 
There's good reason to position late-night shows in terms of small revolu-
tions. In the United States. as a whole, late-night shows are relentless. Neolib-
eralism is little without the offer of endless choice and competition (Kotsko 
2017), so not only are there many choices to watch at around the same 
time-an impossible task-but most shows run just about every week night. 
The sheer volume of comic material and choices has its own effect: none of us 
can take it all in. Even when a particularly insightful or funny segment from 
Jimmy Kimmel goes viral, it's all in the knowledge that another show will be 
produced tomorrow-not because we need it, but because relentlessness is 
the condition upon which most late-night shows are premised. 
A late-night segment might get us to think momentarily about counter-
factual political possibilities, but systemically, these shows keep bringing us 
back to their same starting points the following day. John Oliver's Last Week 
164 Don Waisanen 
Tonight is one exception to this trend that further focuses the problem. Hav-
ing at least a week between airings has allowed Oliver to create something 
more reflective and investigative than what a lot of other shows offer. It also 
airs on a channel whose content is less directed by advertising dollars and. 
most important, in a Sunday night spot when there are few other late-night 
comedy options. At a minimum, by operating off the beaten schedule, Last 
Week Tonight offers viewers a bit less paralysis and more distinction in the 
overall political economy of media. 
That said, a fragmented media landscape only compounds the problem of 
late-night comedy as small revolutions. The audiences for these shows are 
still small and skewed in the younger, liberal direction. In a national U.S. 
poll, the Pew Research Center revealed that 24 percent of those surveyed 
found cable news the most helpful source for learning about the presidential 
election, compared to only 3 percent for late-night comedy shows (Gottfried 
et al. 2017, "Beyond," par 7). Overall, the 
level of usage differed notably by political party identification for late night 
comedy shows. They are a source for three-in-ten Democrats, but only 16% of 
Republicans and a quarter of independents. About a third of those ages 18-29 
(34%) learned about the campaigns and candidates from late night comedy 
shows, higher than any other age group. (par 7) 
If late-night comedy influences political thought in the United States, it's 
mostly constrained to a niche portion of the population who are already sym-
pathetic to its politics . 
Additionally, although there have been spikes in viewership for the more 
politically oriented shows, such as Colbert's and Bee's during the Trump 
administration (Nededog and Gould 2017), the least political of the shows, 
such as Fallon and Kimmel, tend to skew more moderate (The Political 2016). 
If late-night shows that generally engage in political critiques are leftist "echo 
chambers" (Jamieson and Capella 2008), rarely preaching to the unconverted, 
then the problem of small revolutions becomes even more acute-those 
watching the comedy shows always end at the same place they started. 
It's not just about leftists only hearing what they want to hear, however. 
It's what the other side hears and does on a systemic level with these shows 
that makes these revolutions even tinier. Caitlin Flanagan (2017) makes the 
case directly: "Though aimed at blue-state sophisticates, late-night comedy 
shows are an unintended but powerful form of propaganda for conserva-
tives.'' In essence, 
When Republicans see these harsh jokes-which echo down through the morn-
















































nction in the 
~ problem of 





r late night 
,nly 16% of 
ages 18-29 
!,ht comedy 
d States, it's 
already sym-
for the more 
g the Trump 
)f the shows, 
1\itical 2016). 





1 these shows 




g with those 
The Political Economy of Late-Night Comedy 165 
of Jimmy Kimmel, Stephen Colbert, and Seth Meyers-they don't just see a 
handful of comics mocking them. They see HBO, Comedy Central, TBS, ABC, 
CBS, and NBC. In other words, they see exactly what Donald Trump has taught 
them: that the entire media landscape loathes them, their values, their family, 
and their religion. (par 7) 
This isn't simply the opinings of a reporter from The Atlantic. Conservative 
media are replete with these sentiments (Crouere 2017). While many conser-
vative critiques reduce to the "why can't we get Johnny Carson back"' variety, 
and this certainly isn't an argument for Samantha Bee to stop her scathing 
assessments of her political opponents, it does beg the question of whether 
these shows do much at all in politics. In the political economy of media, if 
they are as much a foil as a source of relief, then in a real sense they may 
be as nwch about neoliberal reinscription as anything else. Comedy as small 
revolutions is a snake biting its own tail, so to speak. 
Contrary to popular beliefs that comedy can be revolutionary, practitioners 
even underscore how comedy is really ·'small, logical leaps of absurdity" 
from extant human-realities, rather than farcical material that · runs the risk 
of leaving audiences unable to identify with a topic undergoing humorous 
treatment" (Lynn 2004, 10). In this light, it's worth thinking about how much 
comedy is up against given neoliberal concentrations of power. For instance, 
between 198 J and 2002 Martin Giles and Benjamin Page looked at around 
1,800 policy decisions in the U.S. government and came to the conclusion 
"that economic elites and organized groups representing business interests 
have substantial independent impacts on U.S. government policy, while 
mass-based interest groups and average citizens have little or no independent 
influence'· (as cited in McChesney 2014, 14). 
Rabelais said comedy could bring down feudal orders. and there is evidence 
that jokes can play a role in gradually undermining state regimes (McLeod 
2014. I 2; Riley 2008, 69 ). In essence, "Social change can be nurtured, over 
decades. by means of rather simple (low-tech, low-cost), everyday com-
munication activities ... in most of the world speech is, in fact, all that the 
majority of people possess in terms of persuasive or political power" (Riley 
2008, 311-312). Yet even with the broadcast media platforms that late-night 
comedians use, which can certainly generate important political talk that sets 
in motion social change, we shouldn't lose a sense of scale here. 
As Peter Sloterdijk (1988) highlighted, we ·re dealing with "highly armed 
centers of private reason, conglomerations of power bristling with weapons 
and science-supported systems of hyperproduction. None of them would even 
dream of bending to a communicative reason; rather, under the pretense of 
communication, they want to subjugate the latter to its private conditions'' 
(544 ). In the political economy of media. late-night shows may have the 
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recursive potential to innovate upon the ground from which they stand, but 
they are goaded to incorporate and return to that ground at every juncture. 
CYNICAL LABOR 
Comedy doesn't often get thought about as labor. Late-night shows may 
seem like all fun and games, but the products we're presented with involve 
a tremendous amount of work. It's common to hear comedians say that they 
had to write ten (or more) jokes just to find one that's effective. In this sense, 
there's a lot of hidden labor that also goes into producing, say, Bill Maher's 
monologues every Friday night. And that's before all the testing that goes on. 
Comedians and their teams adhere to data analytic protocols: did the audience 
laugh or not, what worked and didn't, and so on. These are useful yardsticks 
for just about any endeavor, but take on a different look when positioned with 
neoliberalism' s endless drive toward accountability, measurement, ranking, 
and so on. In this larger sense, we should think both about the labor of com-
edy production and the labor that viewers are expected to perform . 
Before getting a job on a late-night show, those who become writers, per-
formers, and others involved in comedy production perform immense labor at 
a variety of institutions. Comedians coming from improv and sketch comedy 
backgrounds typically put in countless hours at organizations like The Second 
City in Chicago, the Groundlings in Los Angeles, or the Upright Citizens 
Brigade (UCB) in New York City and L.A. Each of these institutions has sig-
nature emphases, such as The Second City ' s focus on doing political satire, or 
the Groundlings character-behavioral comedy (Lynn 2004 ). 
The joy of working in the craft and the communal structures that support 
it generally offer some rewards for all the time spent perfecting material and 
performances. But much of this labor is freely given, often for paying audi-
ences, which has occasionally become a full-blown national controversy in its 
own right. One of the founders of the UCB commented that "I don't see what 
[improvisers] do as lab~r. I see guys [sic] onstage having fun. It's not a job'' 
(Zinoman 2013, par 21). Trying to get a job in an area where authority figures 
tell you this isn't a job highlights a structural cynicism toward comedic labor 
itself-a desire to occlude the actual work of comedy as work. 
Although it's more of an individualistic craft those coming from stand-up 
comedy backgrounds perform a great deal of community labor by writing and 
traveling in teams to a variety of institutions, such as the Improv stand-up the-
aters all over the United States. This labor also involves many jobs at low or 
no-pay for a long time period. There's more institutional support for paying 
gigs in stand-up in general, a fact that some argue has led to more diversity in 
the comedic sub-field than in others (Zinoman 2013, pars 24-25). Once one 
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The Political Economy of Late-Night Comedy 167 
finds "success" in industry (if ever) on late-night shows, among other routes 
for a comedy career, this kind of labor is only intensified greatly in the service 
of advertising and corporate returns. 
While there's much to praise about the supportive organizations and net-
work that can be built in a comedy career. what's critical to highlight from 
a systemic viewpoint are the habits and routines that have taken place over 
the course of that long labor period. If, as Kenneth Burke (1984) (referencing 
Thorsten Veblen) reminds us, we all face the danger of "trained incapacity" 
(7) in any profession (i.e., any line of work habitually commits us to acting 
and thinking in certain ways to the exclusion of others), then one danger of 
comedy as neoliberal labor is its commitment to a constant negativity. At the 
core of modern joking is slamming every topic, event, or person that it can 
with a negative attitude (Carter 2001). While it's never talked about in this 
way, constantly applying a lens of "this is stupid" or "what's weird or unusual 
here" (see Besser, Roberts, and Walsh 2013) are the horse blinders of com-
edy, which are elevated to an incessant level by late-night shows . 
Neoliberalism works on a subjective level by. having individuals internal-
ize a certain "interpretive repertoire" of response, such as entrepreneurial 
approaches that seek to compete with and reject others as a matter for routine 
performance (Scharff 2016, 111, 107). Neoliberalism also operates by trying 
to get citizens..to believe that there simply are no alternatives to the present 
conditions, with its attendant ways of being, thinking, and acting (Fisher 
2009). People step into spaces that are already constituted in certain ways 
(Charland 1987), so trained incapacity becomes especially relevant to a neo-
liberal, systemic view of late-night political comedy as limiting alternative 
ways of operating. 
As scholars have highlighted, negativity can be incredibly important for 
critique, but it can also easily devolve into a relentless, detached cynicism 
unmoored from political action or affirmation (Waisanen 2013a~ Hart and 
Hartelius 2007). With an endless cynicism, comedy's ambivalence can be a 
problem for getting political footing and structures for governance (Waisanen 
2018). In the name of institutional returns, we are bid to never stop produc-
ing, never call it a day. and never stop laughing as much as possible. This is 
partly why we have so much comedy flooding every conceivable space now, 
so that even the powerful can't just tell an occasional joke, but must increas-
ingly labor as entertainers. Hillary Clinton's appearance on Between Two 
Ferns breaks records but still becomes a routine matter as cynical labor (she 
initiated the performance, after all) (Jarvey 2016, 7). 
Organizational communication scholars have highlighted the idea of "emo-
tional labor" or "jobs in which workers are expected to display certain feel-
ings in order to satisfy organizational role expectations" (Miller 2015, 73). 
Although a waiter or waitress may not feel like it, being "forced" to smile on 
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the job can be considered emotional labor. Similarly, there's emotional labor 
in working on a late-night show through the pressure to view any and all top-
ics througq a negative lens. Since laughter is the sine non qua of the industry, 
laborers must produce or be subjected to laughter as a condition for the job. 
If "an essential aspect of power is that it only likes to laugh at its own jokes'' 
(Sloterdijk 1988), one also has to wonder how much a hierarchy of laughter 
is forced upon those who would rather not laugh in acts of everyday labor. As 
Lauren Berlant and Sianne Ngai (2017) underscore, "It may be that we hold 
our pleasures closer than our ethics .... Enjoyment, as the psychoanalytic 
tradition has always told us, is a serious thing" (242). 
There's also a cynicism about the labor of these shows and their effects 
built into the media industry's structure. Many still assume that there should 
be hard distinctions between news and entertainment in a new media environ-
ment better seen in terms of hybrid features and functions (Williams and Delli 
Carpini 2011 ). In terms of late-night shows, Matt Carlson and Jason T. Peifer 
(2013) highlight the ''boundary maintenance" that media and other powerful 
institutions continue to draw in these matters (333 ). Neoliberal actors and 
organizations love late night shows to the extent that they can be consigned 
to a separate, cynical, ineffectual space through news and entertainment 
distinctions. -
As James Caron (2016) adroitly states, moreover, "The postmodern condi-
tion exacerbates the dilemma of ethical ridicule that has concerned Western 
thought for centuries: its apparent lack of centering norms or standard values 
for making comic judgments inevitably complicates the contemporary pro-
duction and reception of satire"; it is "comic political speech, but it is not 
political speech" that can fit within the "realm of the serious speech acts of 
policy statements and civic actions'' ( 157). One thinks about Stephen Col-
bert's testimony in character before the U.S. Senate (Adams 2010)-what of 
it, in the end? Inherent to the form and propelled by neoliberal institutions, 
"'Because satire is structured as both-and neither-serious and nonserious, 
it falls prey to being understood as one or the other, as political speech or as 
mere entertainment" (Caron 2016, 165)'. 
What starts out in comedy theaters as unpaid labor propelled by an axiom 
that "this is for fun, ifs not a job" is perpetuated at a systemic level as cyni-
cism about the labor itself. Studies of the effects of political comedy show 
that audiences often "discount" jokes and other humorous textual devices 
(Nabi, Moyer-Guse, and Byrne 2007), but a cynical discounting of late-night 
in general presents an additional challenge to the political potential in such 
work. And, "The more a modem society appears to be without alternatives, 
the more it will allow itself to be cynical. In the end, it is ironical about 
its own legitimation" (Sloterdijk 1988, 112). Lacking legitimation sets the 
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willing to remain without anyone or anything in charge, at the end of the day. 
According to Andres Huyssen, for instance, "The growth of cynicism during 
the 1970s actually provided the cultural soil for the revival of the ideological 
conservatism of the 1980s" (as cited in Sloterdijk 1988, xii). 
Despite the teams that go into producing late-night shows, an additional 
fact remains: these shows are still mostly presented to viewers through 
their individual hosts. Whether it's Conan O'Brien or John Oliver, almost 
every night viewers are implicitly asked to view political comedy's political 
potential in terms of a great person narrative that focuses on an extraordinary 
person rather than citizens' collective capabilities (see Mathews 2014, xvi). 
Along these lines. Peter Sloterdijk ( 1988) argues that "cynicism" as an 
"enlightened.false consciousness. has become a hard-boiled, shadowy clever-
ness that has split courage off from itself, holds anything positive to fraud, 
and is intent only on somehow getting through life" (546). It's the difference 
between "buffoonery" and "good old nasty satire," the kind that Diogenes 
exemplified as a "distance-creating mocker, as a biting and malicious indi-
vidualist who acts as though he needs nobody and who is loved by nobody 
because nobody escapes his crude unmasking gaze uninjured" (89, 4). The 
distinction between a toothless cynicism and a productive kynicism remains 
useful to thinking about how to speak truth to power. Yet under neoliberal-
ism's terms one fault in this line of thought becomes apparent-it still pres-
ents the extraordinary individual rather than movement as the natural loci of 
influence for anything comedy can and should do. 
Finally, the labor of comedy cannot be separated from its invitations and 
interactions with actual audiences. It may seem too obvious, but these are late 
night shows, likely the time of day when audiences are least willing or ready 
to think about politics in much other than quick, shallow. ethereal ways. The 
day is done, so late-night bids for the path of ]east resistance, made material 
by laughs signifying that there's not much energy to be spent. After a11 the 
labor of putting late-night shows together. viewers are too left with a cynical 
warrant: '·Don't labor too much about all this yourselves." The comedy and 
laughter might be useful supplements or inspiring antidotes to political activ-
ism, but it may be too little labor for neoliberalism's cha11enges, highlighting 
a problem that Lilie Chouliaraki (2013) has developed at length: we become 
"ironic spectators'' and little else. 
The system urges us to be "well-off and miserable at the same time, this 
consciousness no longer feels affected by any critique of ideology; its false-
ness is already reflexively buffered" (Sloterdijk 1988, 5). At the same time, 
as much as modern laughter is "the shock of dislocation when mediation is 
revealed'' (Hariman 2008, 262). the revealing of mediation can also serve to 
relocate and reinscribe one into the same picture again. Like the paradoxes 
built into Cecily Strong's character on Saturday Night Live. "The Girl You 
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Wish You Hadn't Started a Conversation With at a Party" (Coggan 2016). 
viewers consistently receive the same message: it's time to put labor into 
being preachy about politics, but whatever happens. don't put labor into being 
preachy about politics. 
TOWARD COLLECTIVE CHEEKINESS 
Examining late-night comedy shows from a neoliberal viewpoint allows us 
to see a great deal that would remain hidden otherwise. To this point, crit-
ics have seldom addressed the ways that mandates for institutional returns 
guide decision making and influence what can even happen in this industry. 
The institutional and systemic pressures that make late-night comedy small 
revolutions are occluded by discourse highlighting "the power of comedy," 
riddled with questionable assumptions as it is. Nor have we much addressed 
the cynical labor that goes into comedy careers, makes its way into institu-
tions, and has become a way of life for many writers, performers, and even 
the audiences watching late-night comedy shows. 
Raising these challenges is not meant to undermine the many positive 
characteristics late-night comedy shows offer public discourse. Amber Day 
(2011) reminds tis that much comedy provides sympathetic audiences with 
motivation and an opportunity to incrementally build opposition to powerful 
forces. A stultifying joylessness is no answer to political dogmatism. But tak-
ing a high-level perspective on late-night shows allows us to see what range 
of possibilities may exist for radical social critique. In this spirit, I'd like to 
offer some thoughts on how late night shows and audiences might become 
less limited by the systemic constraints discussed in this chapter. 
For the time being, late-night comedy television programming isn't going 
anywhere , so I explore the following to find fissures for social change that 
might blossom into something more along the way. Given her finding that 
"corporate and anticorporate rhetorics do not oppose one another so much 
as feed off and respond to one another. ... The market is able to mutate in 
response to adversity," Christine Harold (2007) underscores that a productive 
"pranking'' of all sorts should address "the patterns o.l power rather than its 
contents" (xxxii, 112). It may be the case that "neoliberalism maintains its 
influence on political culture in large part because of its deep embeddedness 
in political language" (Onge 2017, 1), but it's undoubtedly in the systemic 
patterns and forms of public life that that deep embeddedness thrives . Since 
"contemporary commercial culture is dependent on consumers having some-
what routine responses to words and images" (think cynical labor), truly bold, 
jarring, and more complex responses not easily reinscribed into present con-
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responses to hegemony mean "no longer working against, but rather working 
with" and "taking the cultural logics of late capitalism so seriously that they 
begin to undo themselves•· (162). 
Against a paradigm that reduces human beings to atomistic competitors, 
one hope for late-night producers and audiences may be to focus on a "collec-
tive cheekiness" capable of critique, realistic assessments of the larger struc-
tural challenges comedy faces, and an optimism about the possibilities for 
many people to construct a common voice around what society most needs. 
I construct this suggestion as a counter not only to the pressures identified 
above, but also in line with scholarly thought in these areas. In response to the 
reproduction of neoliberal policies that isolates and rules via blameworthiness 
(like cynical labor), Kotsko (2017) argues for a "conscious collective agency" 
and efforts to emerge as a "meaningful 'we''' (493, 497-498, 500, 506-507) . 
At the same time, Sloterdijk ( 1988) argued for "a source of enlightenment 
in which the secret of its vitality is hidden: cheekiness ("Frechheit," a word 
whose meaning lies somewhere between cheekiness and imprudence)" (99-
100). Cheekiness once had a positive connotation as ·'a productive aggressiv-
ity, letting fly at the enemy: 'brave, bold, lively, plucky, untamed, ardent"' 
(103). Examples of a politically productive cheekiness in history include 
Martin Luther (who signaled frivolity in "here I stand ... "), the carnival ("a 
substitute revolution for the poor"), the Bohemians, and above all, Diogenes, 
who generated forms of argumentation ··respectable thinking does not know 
how to deal with" (117. 101). Just as pompous, sublime war rhetoric can be 
bro!:_lght down to earth through comic rhetorical devices like "bathos" (Gil-
bert and Lucaites 2015, 382, 386), strategies for boldness against neoliberal 
recitations can surely be found within comic traditions. 
Diogenes, of course, was a loner with little time for others, so we should 
remain conscious about putting into play cooperative public campaigns. We 
also need to recognize how the presidency of Donald Trump has put Diogenes 
on the national stage. Trump is an earthy, pretentious, pleasure-seeking, "go 
it alone" individualistic mocker in power par excellence. This turning of Dio-
genes on his head was once characterized as a "master cynicism" or "cheeki-
ness that has changed side." as in Marie Antoinette's sick joke, "why don't 
they eat cake" (Sloterdijk 188. 111-112). A way through these conditions 
is to draw attention to the patterns of power at play, "approach unchecked 
fantasy with caution" (McLeod 2014, 284), and above all, leave our media 
cocoons for collective mobilizations. 
To get beyond the problem of comedy as small revolutions, citizens' 
voices need to mean more than isolated laughs in safe settings. Attempting 
to build a common voice, the historic efforts of groups like ACT-UP mani-
fest a collective cheekiness that was hard to miss and forwarded significant 
social changes (Christiansen and Hanson 1996). Many anti-Trump protest 
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signs created at marches around the United States too rise to the level of an 
embodied, public, "collective cheekiness" that laughs, shouts, and speaks 
truth to power in real geographical spaces that are hard to ignore (Kurtz-
man 2017, 4 ). In terms of late-night, Stephen Colbert's intervention into the 
White House Correspondent's Dinner during the Bush administration-and 
the forming of a satirical Super PAC to draw attention to ridiculous campaign 
finance laws-were exceptional moments that set in motion further forms 
of collective cheekiness among many viewers and Internet audiences (see 
Waisanen 2018). 
Crossing multiple platforms with such cheeky comic strategies also 
appears to hold promise for countering neoliberal strongholds. Myles McNutt 
(2017) has found that late-night show segments distributed throughout the 
Internet prioritize a "collaboration common in the YouTube community at 
large," with sketches and all manner of content now '·being 're-ritualized' for 
online audiences, disconnecting the segments from their linear broadcast con-
text and reframing them for nonlinear audiences in light of this once second-
ary space of distribution [for late night shows]" (569). At a minimum, new 
media provide some opportunities to break beyond vertical media structures 
so citizens can repurpose and build horizontal momentum for criticality while 
on their computers, tablets, or phones. 
Like the other authors in this collection, I have sought to advance scholarly 
discussions about neoliberalism and comedy. These are topics easily swept 
under the rug for the sake of laughs, careers, and as this chapter highlighted, 
to reinforce distinctions between the serious and nonserious that too eas-
ily return us to the status quo. They are difficult subjects to navigate, but 
as election results continue to indicate, they're now central to how politics 
gets done. Ultimately, examining the political economy of late-night shows 
reveals that comedy faces many systemic obstacles, challenging us to be 
bolder, cheekier, hold more in common, and above all, think more deeply 
about the systems in which we are all caught. 
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